Abstract. Idle funds show the agency costs of free cash flow. From the perspective of "Institutional Shareholder Activism", this paper studies the question of idle funds by analyzing idle funds raised by listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from the year 2009 to 2014. The empirical results show that free cash flow and idle funds are positively related. Institutional investors can supervise idle funds; but they are more concerned about the use efficiency of idle funds, rather than the question of idle funds. Therefore, under normal circumstances, institutional investors acquiesce to the existence of idle funds in free cash flow.
157 companies are selected in 2011; 123 companies are selected in 2012; 88 companies are selected in 2013; 94 companies are selected in 2014. Data of institutional investors" shares comes from the Wind database; relevant financial data comes from the GuoTai"An database. Spass20.0 statistical software is used to carry out the empirical test.
Setting and interpretation of variables. Regression Analysis. Model 1 shows the relationship between free cash flow and idle funds. The results show that, the growth opportunities of Tobin Q value, velocity of liquid asset, the size of company and cash holding ratio are negatively correlated with idle funds; the relationships are significant when P less than 0.05. If the company has good growth opportunities and large number of investment opportunities, the funds raised by the company will be in short supply. The circulation of capital funds will be fast, and the idle funds rate will decline. Companies with more idle funds tend to have stronger debt paying ability. The cash holding ratio and free cash flow are positively correlated with idle funds, and the relationships are very significant. Free cash flow is also an important part of idle funds. When the value of P is 0.069 which is less than 0.1, the relationship is significant. It indicates that if a company has a lot of free cash flow, it will probably have more idle funds than companies with little cash flow. Model 2 shows the relationship between institutional investors and idle funds. From the verification results, it can be concluded that institutional investors and idle funds are negatively correlated. The value of P is 0.000 which is less than 0.05, means that relationship is significant. Institutional investors can urge the company to actively use raised funds, to improve the use efficiency of funds, and to reduce idle funds. But the coefficient B is -0.002, it represents that if institutional investors change by 1, the idle funds will reduce 0.002. Institutional investors" attention on idle funds is not enough. There is no significant correlation between large shareholders and company"s idle funds, which indicates that shareholders do not pay enough attention to these funds. They mainly care about the investments of company"s idle funds in the future and the expected returns. A.Dependent variable: rate of idle funds. Model 3 shows the relationship between idle funds and enterprise performance. Table 5 shows that idle funds and the performance of company are negatively correlated, but the correlation is not significant. It represents that idle funds just reduce the normal service efficiency of this part of funds.
Idle funds which are used for financial management and purchasing financial products can also get short-term gains. Overall, idle funds and enterprise performance have little relationship. Of course, if the company gives full play to this part of idle funds, the performance of company will be greatly promoted. A.Dependent variable: rate of return on total assets. Model 4 shows the relationship between the various types of institutional investors and idle funds. Table 6 shows that funds, insurance companies, social security funds and QFII are negatively correlated with idle funds. The correlation between funds and idle funds is significant, but the coefficient is -0.001, which means the influence is weak. The broker and idle funds are positively correlated, but the correlation is not significant. It shows that most institutional investors can play a role in the supervision of the companies" idle funds, but that impact is not enough. First, the proportion of institutional ownership is low. Second, institutional investors tacitly approve the company to keep certain free cash flow for the purpose of risk prevention. 
Conclusions
Idle funds are commonly seen in listed companies. These companies use various earnings management means, like falsely increasing the corporations" benefits, dressing up company"s economic performance and exaggerating the expected returns of investment projects, to raise money from capital markets. However, due to difficulties in investment opportunities, the prospects of these investment projects are not bright. Companies cannot quickly put these raised funds into project construction; a large amount of money has to be deposited into banks and become idle funds. Idle funds are often used inefficiently for purchasing other financial products, or being treated as supplement of companies" liquidity.
This paper empirically studies the relationships between idle funds and free cash flow, corporate performance and institutional investors. The results show that free cash flow and idle funds are positively correlated. The more free cash flow exists, the greater amount of idle funds will be. Idle funds do not have weak influence on enterprise performance. Institutional investors have large ratios of shareholding and professional advantages, so they can play a role in the supervision of funds-raising progress and the management of idle funds. Idle funds only bring temporary investment opportunity costs; they do not affect the performance of company. Thus, institutional investors show their acquiescence, and allow the company to retain some idle funds to keep capital turnover. Due to the differences of shareholding ratios, investment preferences and interest relationships with the company, different institutional investors play different roles in idle funds. Among these institutional investors, funds, insurance companies, social security funds and QFII are negatively related with idle funds. It shows that most institutional investors can supervise the management of idle funds, but the supervision is not efficient. The increase of institutional investors" shareholding ratios and the improvement of their supervision abilities are needed in the future.
